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ABSTRACT 
While much attention has been given to examining various aspects of poverty, a 
number of studies have shown that institutional environment in which the poor 
exist conditions welfare outcomes, thus highlighting the inherently crucial 
importance of institutions for poverty reduction. The institutions of property rights 
and collective action are among those identified as playing a major role in the 
livelihood strategies of the poor. This paper highlights ways to operationalize the 
conceptual framework developed by Di Gregorio and colleagues (2008), which 
provides an analytical tool to study poverty through the institutional lens with a 
special focus on collective action and property rights. By emphasizing the 
multidimensionality of poverty, the authors advocate the importance of applying 
various approaches and tools to conceptualizing and measuring it. They also 
emphasize the crucial role that institutions of collective action and property rights 
play in poverty reduction and sketch out theoretical nuances and methods of 
examining such institutions. In addition, power relations and political context are 
seen to be of outmost importance in poverty-related studies; the authors provide 
suggestions on how to understand and operationalize various dimensions of power 
and institutional environment in research. Outcomes are approached from the 
evaluative standpoint, which moves beyond straightforward empirical measurement 
of certain indicators to a comprehensive analysis that would involve a range of 
methods and approaches to both the definition and measurement of criteria that 
affect the complex reality of the poor. 
 
Keywords: collective action, property rights, poverty reduction, evaluation, 
vulnerability, power, institutions, wellbeing 
   
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The authors would like to thank Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Pamela Jagger, and the 
participants of the International Research and Policy Workshop on Collective Action 
and Property Rights for Poverty Reduction for their helpful comments and 
suggestions. The paper was written under the grant from the German Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). The authors are also grateful to the 
Giorgio Ruffolo and Ziff fellowship programs at Harvard University. 
  
Table of Contents 
1.  Introduction ............................................................................................ 1 
2. Conceptual Framework: A Brief Overview ..................................................... 2 
3. Understanding Poverty: Some Measurement And Methodological Issues ........... 5 
Defining poverty  ........................................................................................ 5 
Measuring poverty ..................................................................................... 6 
3. The Context: Some Points Of Entry  .............................................................. 8 
Role of Assets ........................................................................................... 9 
Risk and shocks  ......................................................................................... 9 
Institutions, legal and political environment  ................................................. 12 
5. Tying It All Together: The Role Of Institutions  ............................................. 15 
Property Rights and Poverty Reduction ....................................................... 16 
Collective Action and Poverty Reduction ...................................................... 20 
Outcomes: From measurement to evaluation  ............................................... 26 
6. Conclusion: Back To The Conceptual Framework ......................................... 27 
References ................................................................................................ 28  
 
1 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR POVERTY 
REDUCTION 
A review of methods and approaches 
 
Esther Mwangi 
 and Helen Markelova
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Poverty reduction has come to reflect an urgent global consensus in development.  
The Millennium Development Goals adopted in the 1990 provide a normative 
framework and specific targets for poverty reduction and the enhancement of well 
being. The poverty reduction strategy papers, or PRSPs, on the other hand, provide 
an instrumental road map for achieving the MDG aspirations.  Embedded in these 
global policy efforts is a crucial need to better understand the manifestations of 
poverty and the factors that affect it in order to inform policy and practice, and to 
assess policy performance. 
It is now generally accepted that the poor are those that have few assets 
(both tangible and intangible), are more vulnerable to different forms of risk, and 
are often at a lower end of a power continuum, with limited ability to influence 
policy and practice. Less obvious is an understanding of the way in which 
institutions and institutional change influence poverty. Collective action and 
property rights institutions in developing countries have been demonstrated to have 
positive outcomes for natural resource management. A growing body of literature, 
for example, documents how such institutions enhance natural resources 
management across a broad range of sectors and at multiple levels of governance. 
But there has been considerably less effort to systematically explore how collective 
action and property rights institutions may influence or mediate poverty. Yet there 
seems to be great scope for collective organization (of the poor and their allies) and 
property rights to enhance access to assets that can be used to improve incomes, 
to reduce the risks that climate, disease, and other factors imposed on the poor, or 
to support the poor in processes of change that may serve to empower them.  
This paper attempts to operationalize a conceptual framework developed by 
Di Gregorio et al (2008) that provides key variables and relationships essential to 
an inquiry into the links between poverty reduction and the institutions of collective 
action and property rights. Di Gregorio and colleagues argue that collective action 
in the form of social networks, micro-finance groups, etc. is important for improving 
incomes, accessing and building an assets base, and reducing and coping with 
different forms of risk. Indeed, collective action can be used to secure property 
rights and access to resources, but also to challenge and overturn existing power 
structures or even to create space for the poor to participate in policy dialogue. 
Property rights to different assets provide a sound basis not only for income 
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creation and savings, but also in dealing with shocks and as a form of power that 
can be used to negotiate positions. Thus, poverty reduction implies several things: 
an improvement in people’s well being over time, a reduction in their vulnerability, 
and the incremental/eventual removal of relations that keep people poor. It is a 
long-term process. 
This paper provides an overview of how researchers and practitioners 
conceptualize and measure poverty, property rights, and collective action. It 
outlines ways in which these concepts can be identified and evaluated, and offers 
insights on some of the conceptual and measurement concerns researchers face 
when studying the interactions between collective action, property rights, and 
poverty.  In addition to highlighting various definition and measurement 
approaches for these key concepts, it also emphasizes the overall importance of 
institutions for poverty reduction efforts. 
The rest of the paper is organized into seven sections to correspond with the 
conceptual framework, which is briefly reviewed in the first section. The second 
section looks at different ways to define poverty and methodological issues that 
arise when measuring it.  The third section highlights the role of assets, discusses 
the impact that risk and shocks have on the community, and raises the issues of 
power and the role of external institutions in influencing access to assets and 
collective organization.  The fourth section spotlights the importance of property 
rights and collective action for poverty reduction, by both defining these concepts 
and offering suggestions on how to measure them in poverty studies. The fifth 
section considers the action arena, where actors interact to produce patterns of 
interaction that are associated with the state of poverty as defined here.  The sixth 
section briefly touches upon how to define and evaluate outcomes, and the last 
section concludes by tying all the discussions back to the conceptual framework.  
 
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
 
The conceptual framework that serves as a basis for this paper is described in Di 
Gregorio et al. (2008).  Figure 1 shows the structure and elements of the 
framework.  Its main purpose is to provide a guide for research on the role of 
property rights and collective action in poverty reduction.  For those studying 
poverty, as well as for practitioners and policy-makers, it offers a new approach 
and provides an institutional lens of the causes of poverty and the important role of 
institutions in improving welfare (di Gregorio et al., 2008).   
To analyze how institutions of collective action and property rights influence 
poverty outcomes, the framework distinguishes between the “context” section and 
the “action arena” section.  The “context” deals with the initial socio-economic and 
political conditions that make up the opportunity set for possible action.  Three 
main aspects of the context are identified for closer examination of their role in 
poverty reduction and their relationship to the institutions of collective action and 
property rights: asset endowments, vulnerability to shocks, and power structure of 
the legal and political system.   
The “action arena” shows how multiple actors, including individuals, states, 
and organizations, make use of and change institutions to reduce poverty.  The  
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dynamics in the action arena are conditioned by the actors, action resources they 
draw upon, and the factors that lead to the change in both material conditions and 
institutions.  Actors may be individuals (citizens of a state or members of a 
community) or collective entities (organizations acting as a coherent agent).  Action 
resources are the tangible and intangible resources that give actors the capability to 
act, i.e. to exercise livelihood choices, participate in collective action on various 
levels, to influence other actors’ agency choice, and to participate in political 
processes.   
In an action situation actors make choices and follow strategies based on 
their action resources, the rules that define the action arena, and the attributes and 
expectations about the behavior of other actors involved.  These choices create 
patterns of interaction which in turn produce outcomes.  If these outcomes are 
positive for all actors involved, they will maintain the structure of the action 
situation.  However, if the outcomes are not positive for some or all actors, they will 
try to change their strategy in the action situation using their bargaining power, 
which is shaped by their context. 
The outcomes of action situations, which are of a particular interest in our 
analysis, can be distinguished between structural outcomes, which affect the 
existing context, including property rights and collective action institutions, and 
“poverty outcomes,” which directly affect the conditions of the poor.  The latter 
category can be evaluated according to a number of poverty dimensions, which are 
represented by the evaluative criteria in the framework.  These six criteria are: 
ability to satisfy basic needs, income levels and distribution, personal security and 
security of property, social and political inclusion, and the sustainability of 
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3. UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: SOME MEASUREMENT AND 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Defining poverty 
Poverty refers to whether households or individuals possess enough resources or 
abilities to meet their current needs (Coudouel et al, 2002). This definition also 
implicitly includes the probability or risk of falling (deeper) into poverty at some 
point in the future, i.e. an individual’s or household’s vulnerability to shocks. 
Vulnerability is important because it affects individuals’ behavior with regard to 
investment, production patterns, and coping strategies, including their perceptions 
of their own situation. 
Poverty is usually determined on the basis of income or consumption 
thresholds, which define an individuals or households ability to meet a basket of 
basic goods and services (Coudouel et al, 2002).  Income and consumption poverty 
involves the identification of a monetary measure of household welfare in order to 
capture total income or household expenditure over a period of time. Measures of 
income and consumption poverty are useful in the estimation of the extent (i.e. 
how many individuals below poverty line), depth (i.e. how far off households are 
from poverty line), and severity (degree of inequality among the poor) of poverty 
(Coudouel et al, 2002).  These indicators can also be used to separate the poor into 
various categories (e.g. extremely poor, moderately poor etc.) in order to assess 
their characteristics and policy preferences to facilitate policy targeting (Angelsen 
and Wunder, 2003; Krishna, 2007.  Because consumption reflects the portfolio of 
goods and services available to a household subject to its income, it is thought to 
be a better measure of poverty than income (Coudouel et al, 2002). It also reflects 
a household’s access to credit and its savings.  On the other hand, since incomes 
may fluctuate throughout the year, households and individuals may potentially face 
difficulties recalling their income, and snapshot indicators may be misleading.  
However, many poor people in rural areas of developing countries consume 
the goods they produce or barter them for other goods as they have little or no 
interaction with markets. This creates difficulties in determining the monetary value 
of their production. One can theoretically value self-consumption, but it is difficult 
to do so with precision. Therefore, income and consumption may be incomplete 
measures that fail to capture the local complexity and dynamics of poverty 
(Warner, 2000). Indeed, poverty has many other dimensions which are non-
monetary. For example, even if you have enough goods, they are worth little if you 
are not healthy enough to enjoy them.  On the other hand, a government by raising 
taxes to provide better public services or better public health may increase income 
poverty, while reducing poverty more broadly (Deaton, 2001).  
Amartya Sen (2001) recommends a broader conception of poverty that 
reaches beyond a shortage in income. Poverty is also associated with insufficient 
outcomes with respect to health, nutrition, and literacy, and with deficient social 
relations, insecurity, low self-esteem, and powerlessness. These basic capabilities in 
turn enhance people’s ability to be agents of change; they enhance people’s ability 
to question, challenge, propose, and ultimately usher in new ways of doing things.   
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These different measures of wellbeing are not substitutes for one another, nor can 
one dimension serve as a proxy for another, and, even though income growth may 
help to achieve the reduction of non-income poverty, it is neither necessary nor 
sufficient. For example, improvements in public health such as malaria eradication, 
vaccinations, and clean water led to considerable improvements in life-expectancy 
in many countries of Africa that were experiencing little or no income growth. 
Similarly, in Costa Rica, Cuba, pre-economic reform China, and the Indian state of 
Kerala, health and educational poverty has been effectively eliminated; however, all 
these are income poor countries (Deaton, 2001). 
Thus, a multidimensional perspective of poverty provides a more complete 
picture of deprivation. However, it also complicates analysis as more indicators, 
variables, and relationships must be considered (Chambers, 1997). In particular, 
designing reliable ways of representing non-market income and services and 
determining the effects of social and political dimensions like decision-making, 
power relations, and political participation, present a distinct challenge. 
Additionally, multidimensionality makes comparability across settings more difficult 
while also requiring the determination of relative importance of these dimensions 
for policy targeting and resource allocation (Kanbur and Shaffer, 2007). 
The different definitions of poverty shape our understanding of what poverty 
is, and how severe it can be, i.e. its multidimensionality. In addition, several 
studies show that the poor are not static and that there is some mobility around a 
threshold (see stages of progress project by Anirudh Krishna;
2 Hulme et al. 2001; 
Hulme and Shepherd, 2003). This has opened a new set of studies aimed at 
understanding the dynamics of poverty, i.e. the characteristics of and conditions 
under which individuals and groups are caught in poverty traps or the types of 
assets and conditions that allow individuals to move and stay out of poverty.  
 
Measuring poverty 
Different definitions of poverty imply different indicators, some more quantifiable 
than others; thus, different methods must be used to fully capture the 
multidimensionality of this concept. Household surveys (or objective methods) are 
used to analyze the welfare distribution and poverty characteristics, while 
participatory (more subjective) methods provide an opportunity to document and 
study poverty based on reporting by the poor themselves according to their own 
perceptions.  The question of the relative strengths and weaknesses of aggregate 
household surveys and more participatory methods has been the focus of much 
interest by both researchers and practitioners (Kanbur and Shaffer, 2007; Zeller et 
al, 2006; Kanbur, 2003). Household surveys usually involve the collection of 
nationally representative sample data of income or consumption through 
questionnaires that capture the variables of interest, often standardized across 
countries. 
Qualitative/contextual research tools range from participatory assessments 
such as wealth ranking to ethnographic and sociological case-studies to institutional 
political investigations. Such methods are often more appropriate for capturing the 
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social and institutional context of people’s lives than quantitative methods (Booth et 
al., 1998). They can capture information that may not be well represented in 
household surveys such as intrahousehold inequalities; subjective perceptions of 
poverty according to gender, ethnicity, etc; non-market dimensions such as poor 
and women’s foraging activities; poor peoples’ priorities for action; coping 
strategies; and cultural, political, and sociological determinants of poverty. 
There is a growing recognition that a judicious combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods can help solve problems that are associated with each type of 
method taken separately (Kanbur, 2003; White, 2002). Often, the distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative methods is fuzzy because qualitative methods 
can yield quantitative results and vice versa (Ravallion, 2005a). Kanbur and Shaffer 
(2007) indicate that these approaches vary in a continuum along five dimensions: 
type of information, population coverage, degree of population involvement, 
inferential method, and disciplinary framework.  Based on these differences, studies 
that use both methods benefit from the richness of qualitative and quantitative data 
analyzed through a variety of techniques.   
For example, in assessing poverty issues in several countries in East and 
Southern Africa, Ellis and colleagues adopted both qualitative and quantitative 
techniques for data collection. The qualitative part addressed the policy and 
institutional context of livelihoods at community level, while a quantitative 
component addressed assets, activities, incomes, and vulnerability factors at 
household level. Through this mix of methods, useful insights were obtained 
regarding the institutional context within which individuals and households attempt 
to construct viable livelihood strategies (Ellis et al., 2003; Ellis and Bahigwa, 2003; 
Ellis and Mdoe, 2003; Ellis and Freeman, 2004). 
A series of case studies on the impact of agricultural research on poverty in 
Bangladesh, Kenya, Zimbabwe, Mexico, China, and India (Adato and Meinzen-Dick, 
2007) found qualitative and quantitative data to be important complements.  The 
case-studies drew upon participatory poverty assessments (PPAs) as well as 
quantitative indicators of poverty.  Household surveys provided broad 
representation and the ability to quantify changes in welfare status, particularly 
where panel surveys were available.  Qualitative data, including focus groups, semi-
structured interviews, and ethnographic observation provided important insights on 
the dynamics of poverty, particularly perceptions of vulnerability, the role of 
institutions, and power relations.
3   
In sum, PPAs and qualitative techniques more generally serve to highlight 
possible complications in the meaning of poverty, to emphasize the role of a wider 
range of causal processes than has been recognized by mainstream poverty 
analysis, and to guide the uses that are made of quantitative data in arriving at 
appropriate policies and practices (Booth et al., 2006).
4 Moreover, an analysis of 
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4While the policy relevance of  case studies and qualitative techniques rely on cases being typical 
for larger groups of households, Russell (2005)  suggests that a case study even of a small number of 
families such as he conducted in Sri Lanks can generate additional policy-relevant knowledge that 
would be missed by conventional surveys. For example, detailed cost burden data of illness and 
related asset or coping data help inform health financing debates. Moreover, free health care services  
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causes is more compelling if it is informed by the poor’s own vision of the dynamics 
of poverty and the processes leading to impoverishment and disimpoverishment. 
Quantitative techniques, on the other hand, provide the opportunity of assessing 
times-series and trends along relevant dimensions, cross-sectional comparisons 
between different individuals, households, groups, and communities, and across 
regions, countries, and continents, and estimating prevalence and distribution 
within population areas (Mayoux and Chambers, 2005). Additionally, such 
techniques offer the credibility of numbers that are often useful for influencing 
policy makers.  
An additional approach to studying poverty, proposed by German and Stroud 
(2007) links together development research and practice.  Participatory action 
research (PAR), which combines participatory action learning and action research, 
allows the actors themselves (individuals, communities, institutions) to identify key 
challenges and come up with solutions through dialogue and reflection as well as 
gain better understanding of the process of development.  The main benefit of this 
approach is the combination of action (improvement in well-being) and research 
(advancement of understanding of causes of poverty).  However, German and 
Stroud strongly encourage researchers to apply PAR in combination with the 
empirical research methods discussed above. 
3. THE CONTEXT: SOME POINTS OF ENTRY 
In this section we discuss the significance of contextual factors to poverty reduction 
and suggest ways to measure them.  Contextual factors include assets, risks and 
shocks, and legal/political structure as depicted in the diagram below. 
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Role of Assets 
 
The poor employ multiple income-generating activities, which depend on 
ownership/access to assets that enable them to diversify their livelihoods in order 
to construct viable pathways out of poverty or to maintain their current 
consumption (Winters et al., 2002; Ellis, 1998).  For example, in a recent wealth 
ranking exercise in eight villages in Malawi Ellis et al. (2003) found that households 
described as well-off are distinguished by having landholdings of 1.5–2 hectares, up 
to five heads of cattle, three to five goats as well as hiring nonfamily labor 
seasonally, owning bicycles, and sometimes owning non-farm service sector 
businesses. Ownership of fishing gears was a key wealth indicator in the fishing 
villages. Poorer households, on the other hand, possess little or no land, no cattle 
or goats, and rely on casual work or safety net transfers to get by.  
Assets are more than just income or ownership of animals or farm 
equipment.  In addition to both cash and in-kind income, key assets include social 
institutions (kin, family, village), gender relations, and property rights needed to 
sustain a certain standard of living.  Access to social and public services such as 
education, health services, water supplies, and roads plays a key role in livelihoods.  
Social capital comprising different types of networks and social organizations is 
increasingly recognized as critical for enabling the poor to secure access to different 
types of assets (Ellis, 1998). Assets are thus important for constructing livelihoods 
and for preventing people from sliding into poverty when faced with risks. They are 
also the basis of agents’ power to act and to reproduce, challenge, or change the 
rules that govern the control, use, and transformation of resources (Bebbington, 
1999). Whether and how people organize to access these diverse forms of assets 
(i.e collective action), or whether they can lay enforceable claims to these assets 
(i.e property rights) is central to poverty reduction efforts. 
Rights to land and other natural resources are particularly important since 
many rural populations continue to dependent directly on agriculture and common 
pool resources such as forests, fisheries, and pastures as a basic livelihood 
strategy. In many cases, these assets are a source of income that enables 
individuals to invest in improved farm practices or even in non-farm assets, and 
broaden the scope for further income generation or to reduce risk. Similarly, by 
investing in networks and collective activities, individuals and groups are able to 
increase the assets in their command as well as reduce income risks that result 
from climatic variability, disease, and other shocks as seen in the next section. 
 
Risk and shocks 
Most literature on poverty emphasizes that the poor are extremely vulnerable to 
shocks, which pushes them into greater impoverishment and often perpetuates 
chronic poverty (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999; Krishna et al., 2004; Dercon, 2002).  It 
is important to keep in mind that while vulnerability to shocks is an element of the 
multifaceted concept of poverty, it should not be equaled to poverty since not all 
poor are vulnerable, and not all vulnerable are poor.  In addition, some researchers  
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see poverty as a more static concept defined in terms of asset ownership, while 
vulnerability is seen as a dynamic state which may affect the poor more than 
income and asset poverty (Davies and Bennett, 2007; Moser, 1998).   
Just like poverty, vulnerability is a multidimensional concept: shocks come 
from multiple sources, affect whole communities (covariate) and individual 
households (idiosyncratic), influence one or more livelihood sources at a time, and 
demand multiple sophisticated responses.  Moreover, shocks leave the poor with 
numerous “layered” consequences: a decline in income might not just lead to a 
decline in consumption of certain goods, but to the deterioration of nutritional 
status, which will push the poor further into the vicious cycle of poverty (Jalan and 
Ravallion, 1999; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000).  This complex reality is exacerbated 
by pervasive imperfections in credit and insurance markets and often unfavorable 
legal and political environment that make it difficult for the poor to weather shocks 
(Udry, 1994). 
Generally, shocks are categorized into climatic shocks (floods, droughts), 
economic fluctuations (price changes), insecurity and political instability, and 
individually specific shocks (Dercon 2002; Little et al. 2001).  Little et al. (2001) 
also add insecurity and political instability as a source of risk in many developing 
countries.  Health shocks are identified as the most harmful in the short- and long-
term by many studies (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007; Krishna et al., 2004; Dercon, 
2002).  However, while risks that the poor face are multiple and pervasive, the poor 
should not be seen as passive recipients of their “fate.”  On the contrary, in the 
context of complex and uncertain environment, they have become skillful managers 
of their portfolios employing multiple strategies to cope with shocks (Davies and 
Bennett, 2007; Moser, 1998).  These strategies include risk-coping mechanisms, 
which involve self-insurance through assets, savings, and informal group-based 
risk-sharing (which usually consists of informal credit and gift transactions), and 
risk-management strategies, which involve income diversification and income 
skewing (Alderman and Paxson 1994).   
Since the previous section already considers the multiple roles that assets 
play in the livelihoods of the poor, it is important to just mention that the poor 
mobilize various assets (physical, human, financial, social) when faced with a 
shock.  Examples of this use include increasing family labor supply by involving 
women and children in productive activities, using housing for home-based 
enterprises, selling livestock and other assets, and calling upon social relations 
(Moser, 1998; Davies and Bennett, 2007).  However, there are several issues that 
make assets an unreliable source of self-insurance.  Often, they are impossible to 
liquidate or are sold at low prices due to increased supply during a covariate shock.  
In addition, just owning an asset is not enough: its real value during a shock 
depends on the ability to manage it, transform it into income, and benefit from it 
based on the property rights regime, governance environment, necessary 
infrastructure, and availability of information and markets (Moser, 1998; Dercon, 
2002).    
Social institutions are among the most-used tools in the risk-management 
portfolio of the poor.  They represent part of the asset base that is often used for 
transfers such as gifts and loans in the time of uncertainty.  Since formal credit and 
insurance mechanisms are often absent, the poor establish informal networks for 
risk smoothing upon which they can call upon in time of need.  Most of such  
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informal transactions are done between families  and neighbors or friends within 
the same village for easier monitoring of reciprocity and repayment (Fafchamps and 
Lund, 2003; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007).  Such informal credit transactions play 
an important part in stabilizing consumption in the circumstances of fluctuating 
incomes.   
As for the risk-management strategies, these mechanisms usually include 
income smoothing activities through income diversification (combining several 
sources of income, usually farm and off-farm) or income-skewing (allocating 
resources to low-risk, but low-return activities) (Dercon, 2002).  While it may seem 
as the optimal way to manage shocks, research shows that this method may not 
always work best to insure against income shocks since farm and non-farm 
activities may move together during a time of uncertainty.  In addition, Davies and 
Bennett (2007) show that in some situations, as in the case of Ethiopian 
pastoralists, diversifying sources of income by investing in activities other than 
those around cattle may result in the breakdown of social capital, a crucial asset 
widely utilized by the pastoralists during shocks.   
While the poor employ multiple strategies to deal with risk, the impact of 
shocks is heterogeneous and is based on their asset portfolio and other coping 
strategies available to them.  This fact is important to keep in mind when studying 
risk since studies have shown that even the informal mechanisms tend to work less 
for the poorest and that the better-off households in the communities fair with 
shocks better (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999; Dercon and Krishnan, 2000).  In addition, 
this heterogeneity is played out on the household level: research has shown that 
income fluctuations affect women and girls more than the male members of the 
household, which in most cases is a result of legal regulations (such as divorce and 
land tenure rules) that favor men over women (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; 
Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990).      
The discussion above emphasizes the need to take a more critical approach 
to examining risk and vulnerability.  First and foremost, while vulnerability is an 
essential element of the state of impoverishment, it is not synonymous with it.  
Similarly, it is important to carefully study the relationship between vulnerabilities 
and capabilities as well as between vulnerabilities and asset ownership (since, in 
addition to ownership, there must be the ability to manage the assets) (Moser, 
1998).  When trying to measure an impact of a shock on a household and evaluate 
a household’s response to it, it is first useful to examine the nature of shocks 
(frequency, intensity, geographical spread, and predictability) that affect the 
household and the community where the household resides.  Then, it is necessary 
to consider other factors that might condition how the household deals the current 
and potential shocks.  Such information includes data on physical and human 
capital combined with the data on the functioning and opportunities in the labor and 
asset markets (which will also allow to identify vulnerable households); survey of 
existing institutions, both formal and informal (especially social arrangements), 
customs, and legal framework (divorce laws, tenure systems) (Dercon and 
Krishnan, 2000); data on informal credit and insurance systems (Udry, 1994; 
Davies and Bennett, 2007); and information on coverage and past performance of 




Institutions, legal and political environment 
  For many scholars, poverty is inherently a political problem (Hickey and 
Bracking, 2005; Moser, 2005; Mosse, 2004; Engberg-Petersen, 2002). Its 
persistence reflects its institutionalization within social and political norms and 
structures, and its legitimization within political discourse. The broader institutional 
environment in which local level actors are embedded influences the conditions they 
face—whether they have rights and the kinds of rights they can claim, whether 
(and how) they can be part of organized groups, and whether they can even 
organize freely without fear of disruption or retribution. Elements of the broader 
institutional environment include laws (both statutory and customary), maintenance 
of order, the nature and effectiveness of macro-economic policy, the nature of 
state-society interactions, political regime, infrastructure development, investments 
in human capital, etc. All these elements can serve to limit or enhance the extent to 
which actors, whether individual or collective, can access their assets. 
 
Power and poverty  
Before looking at factors of the external environment and how to make them 
operational, it is important to consider the problem of power, because the 
distribution of power is a primary determinant of the institutions that get adopted 
and implemented (Knight, 1992).  Robert Dahl’s (1961, 1957) research of power 
issues suggested that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do.” This conception of power can be 
determined by examining who participates, who gains and loses, and who prevails 
in a specific decision making arena. However, participation in decision making 
overlooks the problem of non-participation or inaction and narrows the scope of 
policy to actions that increase participation (e.g. education, increased income); 
participation itself may face power constraints.  
Bachrach and Baratz (1962) suggest that power includes situations where 
individuals/groups work to limit the scope of public debate and decisions to those 
issues that are relatively harmless in themselves. This second, hidden, face of 
power is concerned not only with participation and outcomes in a given decision 
arena, but also with the exclusion of certain participants and issues.  Lukes (1974) 
introduced a third dimension to the concept of power: power can shape the ways 
the powerless perceive their wants: “A exercises power over B when A affects B in a 
manner contrary to B’s interests.”   In Luke’s view, power makes existing social, 
economic, and political relations seem natural.  This conception includes the 
complex idea of the hegemony of the powerful and the production of a “false 
consciousness” among subordinate groups who appear to be in consensus with 
systems that oppress them (Mosse, 2004). 
Because power manifests in different and complex ways, including 
dimensions that are intangible and non-material, it is difficult to measure. The 
second and third dimensions of power are especially difficult to operationalize 
because they are not easily observable.  The poor, in particular, may act in ways 
that diminish their well-being because speaking out against ruling elites may  
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jeopardize access to scarce opportunities or may even pose a risk to their lives 
(Engberg-Pedersen, 2002; Webster, 2002). Scholars have, however, attempted to 
study these dimensions and the mechanisms by which they manifest. The first 
dimension of power is widely understood and involves the use of resources by 
actors to manipulate decisions. These resources include wealth, votes, jobs, 
positions in organizations, social and cultural status, rules, etc., and they can be 
directly observed or obtained through both qualitative and quantitative techniques 
such as administering surveys, interviewing key informants, wealth ranking, or 
mapping outcomes.  
Certain aspects of the second dimension of power (i.e. keeping issues and 
people out of a decision-making arena) can be observed or determined, and the 
mechanism by which it is affected can be identified. For example, the threat or use 
of force, the threat or use of sanctions, intimidation, the manipulation of rules to 
exclude or just simple inaction by those in positions to take action are some 
indicators.  The third dimension is the most difficult to operationalize and involves 
identifying the means by which a more powerful individual or group can shape the 
way a less powerful individual or group conceives of their issues and situation, or 
keep potential issues relevant to the less powerful out. Measuring this dimension 
involves determining how power shapes and influences/determines how less 
powerful groups and individuals conceive of the possibilities and strategies of 
challenging power where conflict is less visible or latent. It may involve the study of 
how social myths, symbols, and language are used and manipulated in power 
processes, i.e. locating the power processes behind the social construction of 
meanings and patterns.  
For example, Gaventa’s (1980) study of power relations in the Central 
Appalachia region of the United States attempted to uncover the three dimensions 
of power. He found that non-decision making power functions through institutional 
practices and revealed the processes by which dominant actors manipulate myths, 
rumors, and symbols to exercise third-dimensional power. He also demonstrated 
that the three dimensions of power are mutually reinforcing and that historical 
studies are crucial to discover whether routines of non-conflict have been 
established and how they have been maintained.  
Scott (1990), on the other hand, focuses on language and ideology to 
understand how power relations may underscore the apparent consent of 
subordinate groups who have been forced to conceal their activities and real 
opinion from public authorities. He relies on a wide range of methods including 
linguistic ethnography, sociolinguistics, folklore, history to interpret rumors, gossip, 
folktales, gesture, jokes, folksongs, trickster tales, and slave narratives. His work 
not only unveils the problem of conducting research among subordinated groups, 
but also suggests that decoding the hidden language of those subordinated is 
crucial to understanding large scale collective action such as rebellions, riots, and 
social movements. 
Because the mechanisms of power comprise laws, rules, norms, customs, 
social identities, and standards that constrain and enable inter- and intra-subjective 
action, to exercise power is thus to act upon social limits to action and other social 
boundaries that define the field of what is possible, for another or for the self 
(Hayward, 1998). As a consequence, the analysis of power relations requires 
looking beyond the distribution of political resources and their intended use in  
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interaction to include how power shapes the field of what is possible, not only for 
actors typically identified as ‘powerless’ but also for those who seem ‘powerful.’  It 
also includes the notion of political representation, which concerns the creation of 
classifications through which individuals/groups interests are represented within 
political systems.    
Moser (2005) suggests that methodologies and tools aiming to provide a 
better understanding of the way that power affects the production and reproduction 
of poverty and insecurity must include an analysis of rights regimes, which 
identifies rights regimes at different levels and their associated domains and 
operational or authority structures. The analysis will need to include a channel 
of contestation matrix, which identifies various institutional channels through 
which claims can be contested (political, legal, policy, administrative, social, and 
private sectors), the types of claims that relate to each institutional domain, and 
the method of citizen action that can be used to make those claims. 
The study of power relationships, which is crucial to understanding why the 
poor are poor in the first place and why they remain poor, is complex and requires 
the study of both overt and covert processes, an analysis of which issues make it to 
the public agenda as well as the converse, analyses at multiple levels, and a 
historical and contemporaneous analysis of political, social, and cultural institutions. 
It is largely a qualitative and interpretive exercise.  
 
The broader institutional environment and poverty 
In measuring the impacts of broader reforms on the property rights, access, and 
collective organizing of the poor, both qualitative and quantitative techniques can 
be used, and the dimensions of poverty discussed in earlier sections can be taken 
into account. However, the primary measurement concern is one of attributing 
causality to a reform process. This can be incorporated into research design by 
conducting a survey of the affected communities before and after a reform. 
Alternatively, areas where the reform has been implemented versus where it has 
not been implemented can provide the basis for generating the nature of effects or 
different levels/stages of implementation. If conducted in the same country, then 
there can be opportunity of keeping the political regime, political culture, 
bureaucratic capacity, aid dependency, etc. relatively constant. A cross-country 
study would need to take cross-country variation across the aforementioned 
dimensions into account.  In addition to this, different categories of individuals 
(men, women, poorer, wealthier) and groups can be asked directly what the effects 
of reform processes have been on their access to resources and capacity to 
organize either through individual or community-level surveys and participatory 
techniques. Key informants from both the public sector and NGOs can be 
interviewed as well.  
Developing country elites’ perceptions of poverty may also matter to the 
extent that such views may influence collective action for strategies to tackle 
poverty and provide services to the poor. A particular concern may be to determine 
whether and how poverty represents a threat to contemporary elites, including 
whether or not poverty might impact negatively on elite welfare and thus provide a 
reason for elites to support pro-poor reforms (Hossain, 2005).   
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In his assessment of methodological implications regarding the impacts of 
broader institutions, Fox (2004) relies heavily on qualitative analytical techniques, 
with identifying sub-national comparisons and institutional ethnographies being 
particularly essential in the analysis of institutional change and poverty reduction. 
In studying the outcomes of decentralization for example, a focus on sub-national 
variation may allow for comparisons that control for social, political, and economic 
differences, subsequently permitting the analysis of relationships between specific 
institutional changes and social actors. Institutional ethnography may allow an 
examination of behavioral changes associated with pro-poor reforms, capturing 
both obvious and hidden patterns. Fox also highlights that carefully performed 
institutional ethnographies at sub-national levels can reveal patterns of variation 
that can be aggregated to produce generalizable results. It goes without saying that 
such in-depth assessments should be participatory, drawing from stakeholder 
analysis of how these institutional reforms affect them. 
 
5. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS 
While much has been written on the role of assets, risks, and political structures for 
poverty reduction, this paper attempts to bring these disparate bodies of research 
together and analyze their importance for poverty-related studies by looking at 
them through the lens of institutions, particularly those of property rights and 
collective action.  This is done by demonstrating the close links that exist between 
all the elements in the context section of the conceptual framework of Di Gregorio 
and colleagues and by showing how examining each of its elements in connection 
with the institutions of collective action and property rights may shed new light on 
poverty-related research.   
The discussion in the previous sections points out numerous points of 
intersection between assets, risk, and institutional environment, and the institutions 
of collective action and property rights.  For example, both collective action and 
property rights are part of the asset base of the poor: the former is one of the 
“capitals” in their portfolio, and the latter is an intangible asset that allows the poor 
to directly own and/or benefit from physical and other assets.  Moreover, as 
discussed above, social relations are crucial for risk-smoothing in times of shocks; 
property rights, by granting various rights to a resource, allow the poor to 
effectively use their assets during economic and climatic fluctuations.  Lastly,  
policies and laws enacted at national and regional levels can affect the property 
rights of the poor by enhancing access to assets, for example, through 
redistributive land reforms or decentralization reforms where elite capture has been 
thwarted.  In other cases, legal reform or state action can improve the collective 
organization of the poor.   
Therefore, collective action and property rights are an integral part of the 
context in which the poor live.  The next section will present ways to conceptualize 
and measure property rights and collective action to examine their impact on the 




Property Rights and Poverty Reduction 
Rights to Land and Resources 
 
Rights over land and other natural resources play a fundamental role in human 
society.  The distribution of wealth and poverty is a reflection of underlying 
property rights. In this section, we provide suggestions on how to examine under 
what conditions access to land is likely to be an important contributor to efforts of 
reducing rural poverty and how we can measure the importance of land access for 
poverty reduction. 
Descriptive analyses can provide a general indication of the correlation of 
income and consumption and land holdings, often forming the basis for more 
intricate quantitative procedures. For example, in Tanzania Ellis & Mdoe (2003) 
compared the size of land holdings across income terciles and quartiles and found 
that the population in the highest income quartile owned, across all villages studied, 
over twice the amount of land owned by the group in the lowest income quartile. 
Several longitudinal studies have also used income and/or expenditure to capture 
the welfare-enhancing effects of land in different settings, for example, in Chile 
(Scott, 2000), among resettled farmers in Zimbabwe (Gunning et al., 2000), and in 
Cote d’Ivoire (Grootaert et al, 1997). In these studies, household incomes and 
expenditures serve to proxy household welfare. The effects of household land 
holdings on household welfare over time are examined, often taking into account 
that income/expenditure levels may be influenced by the levels of other assets 
(such as livestock, hired labor, machinery, transfers, etc), shocks including 
environmental shocks (droughts, floods, earthquakes), household specific shocks 
(crop damage, livestock losses, windfalls, disease/accidents), as well as the 
attributes of household heads (education) and of the geographic location. By taking 
into account these variables, the authors were able to isolate the effects of land 
holdings (i.e. size and access) on household welfare.  
In addition to identifying effects, it is useful to consider the conditions under 
which land access and availability may be of value to poverty reduction efforts, 
including the interactions of various assets with land. Finan, Sadoulet, and De 
Janvry (2005) have considered these different dimensions in Mexico. For example, 
they construct a welfare index which, in addition to measures of income and 
consumption, consists  of various dwelling characteristics (running water, 
electricity, presence of a bathroom, number of rooms, and dirt floors), household 
durables (ownership of a blender, refrigerator, television, and truck), and other 
contextual variables such as access to infrastructure (roads, health centers) and 
ethnicity. Their findings show that households’ access to only one hectare of land 
can be sufficient to enable them escape poverty if they have access to a paved 
road. In South Africa the post-apartheid land restitution and redistribution 
programs have done little to contribute to poverty reduction (Bradstock, 2005). 
Households allocated a plot of land could not exploit it because the plots were too 
distant, or due to credit failures or low human capital development. Thus, the value 
of land for livelihoods depends on how that piece of land interacts with other 
assets. In general, the welfare-enhancing effects of access to land may be limited  
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by the lack of access to complementary assets or unfavorable policies and 
institutions (de Janvry et al., 2001).  
Rights to land and other resources are increasingly perceived as a bundle of 
rights (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992) as opposed to just simply private, state, or 
common property. These bundles comprise: access (the right to enter a defined 
physical area and enjoy non-subtractive benefits); withdrawal (the right to obtain 
resource units or products of a resource system, for example, catch fish, divert 
water); management (the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the  
resource by making improvements); exclusion (the right to determine who will have 
access rights and withdrawal rights, and how those rights may be transferred); and 
alienation (the right to sell or lease management and exclusion rights). Even 
without complete ownership (i.e. the right to alienate), individuals and groups may 
still have access to resources that make significant contributions to their livelihoods, 
for example, where pastoralists graze livestock on fallow land that may belong to 
individual farmers. On the other hand, groups may collectively own resources, with 
shared access restricted among recognized members. The unbundling of rights 
reveals the multidimensionality of land and resources and allows for the possibility 
that resources can be used in different ways by different user groups. Unbundling 
also separates the question of whether a particular right is ‘well-defined’ from the 
question of the effects of having a particular set of rights (Ostrom, 2000). Whatever 
the stick in the bundle that an individual or group holds, one of the key concerns is 
whether those rights and claims are secure and have the potential of sustaining 
current consumption or increasing consumption over the long term. 
In many parts of the developing world common pool resources such as 
forests, fisheries, and rangelands, which may all be held under different property 
arrangements such as state, common property, or private, contribute significantly 
to rural livelihoods. Many studies show that access and withdrawal rights to the 
commons often have a positive impact on the livelihoods of the poorer and 
marginalized members of communities through meeting regular subsistence needs, 
providing some cash income, or even serving as safety nets during lean times 
(Meinzen-Dick et al., 2006).   
In order to reach a valuation of the contribution of environmental resources 
to household livelihoods, researchers assessed the quantity of products harvested 
or collected from the commons through interviews, weighing, and consumption 
assessments (Adhikari, 2005; Beck and Nesmith, 2001; Cavendish, 2000; Jodha, 
1986, 1995; Dei, 1992). Households would report on the value of their resource 
consumption or sales; locally-traded substitutes can be used to assign values where 
one is unable to assign a price to the resource. Errors in estimating contribution of 
environmental resources to household livelihoods may result from a failure to 
measure and account for the entire (or more comprehensive) portfolio of products.  
Such oversight may occur because some products in a household’s portfolio of 
goods are not traded in formal markets and thus cannot be priced.  Moreover, some 
products may be excluded from a household’s budget due to problems with recall. 
The distinguishing feature is that such income is ‘earned from wild or uncultivated 





Conceptualizing and measuring security of rights  
It is generally recognized that secure rights to land are a necessary condition for 
livelihoods maintenance and poverty reduction because they provide the incentives 
required for individuals and/or groups to undertake investments in land 
management activities that enhance land and resource productivity and 
sustainability.  Place et al. (1994) describe tenure security as comprising of 
freedom from interference from outside sources, the possibility of continuous use, 
and an ability to reap the benefits of labor and capital invested in the resource, i.e. 
the duration and assurance of rights. Duration refers to the length of time over 
which the individual/group may enjoy specific rights, while assurance refers to the 
ability of individuals to exercise their rights.  
How tenure security is conceptualized and measured has not been consistent. 
Some researchers have equated tenure security with the possession of registered 
land titles (Feder et al., 1986) or with the legal comprehensiveness of the proof of 
ownership (Deininger and Chamorro, 2004).  In their review of property rights and 
technology adoption, Place and Swallow (2000) show that some researchers have 
focused on the breadth of rights (i.e. the number of rights in the bundle that are 
held by individuals) or the presence/absence of key land rights as perceived by 
respondents, or whether land has been purchased, rented, or leased as proxies for 
tenure security. In this last method authors often theorize that holdings under lease 
rights have a greater risk of appropriation.  
Golan’s (1990) study in Senegal’s peanut basin (cited in Schmid, 1994) for 
example identified three levels of tenure security: fields with secure rights; fields 
with moderately secure rights, which could not be taken away from the 
farmer/manager, but for which the farmer/manager could not determine the crop, 
seed, or pesticide use, or did not know if they would be working the field in the 
following year. Insecure fields were those where someone had the rights to take 
away the land from the farmer/manager.  These indicators are largely qualitative, 
but quantitative values can be computed from them to determine levels of tenure 
security.  
A different proxy for security can be the right to transfer or alienate a 
resource. Place and Hazell (1993), for example, grouped land rights into three 
categories: complete rights whose current managers can sell; parcels that cannot 
be sold but can be given or bequeathed, i.e. preferential transfer parcels; and 
parcels that may not be permanently transferred, i.e. limited transfer parcels. 
These studies conducted in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda found that even 
management rights (i.e. with limited transfer rights) derived from customary 
authority did not affect investment decisions and productivity. Other studies 
conducted in Africa (Migot-Adholla et al., 1991; Bruce and Migot-Adholla, 1994) 
also found little difference in productivity, investment levels, or access to credit; 
“incomplete” but well-defined rights under customary law were sufficiently secure. 
Thus, households with rights to alienate land or to make long-term improvements 
on land are not necessarily more secure than those with only use rights to land. 
Similarly, the range of rights held over a resource may not always impede 
investments in and income generation from that resource for as long as the right is 
secure. Nonetheless, transferability can be valuable. It can increase the ability to 
raise cash through sale or rental of the property (also through credit) and by 
allowing farmers to endow heirs with key assets (Baland et al., 2007; Lyne, 2005).  
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The significance of land title in security and investment is, however, not 
straightforward (Deininger and Chamorro, 2004). There is the possibility that 
investment may in fact drive security. In certain cases tree planting or 
borehole/water well development, land clearing, investment in soil quality, etc. may 
lead to higher levels of tenure security for the investor as the investment itself may 
signify a means of staking a claim to the land (Gray and Kevane, 2004; Brasselle et 
al., 2002; Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997). Thus, there is the possibility of reverse 
causality as land rights may be endogenous, which needs to be controlled for as 
done by Braselle et al (2002).  
Tenure security can also be determined by considering the nature, levels, 
and intensity of conflict/disputes, including encroachment and direct evictions. 
Working in Ethiopia, Deininger and Jin (2005) measured tenure security by village-
level or individual experience of land reallocation taking into account households’ 
expectations about future village-level reallocations. The presence, accessibility, 
and effectiveness of dispute resolution mechanisms, whether statutory or 
customary, may also signal the presence of secure rights and claims.  In addition, 
whether the enforcing entity is seen as legitimate can provide an indication of 
whether or not rights will be respected. Multiple and competing legal systems for 
land allocation and distribution, especially if uncoordinated, can signify some level 
of insecurity (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan, 2002). Moreover, people can improve the 
security of their rights, whatever the stick in the bundle, through investing in their 
relationships with others. Berry (1993) demonstrates that rights over land and 
resources are linked with social networks and patronage. In Southern Ghana, 
Goldstein and Udry (2004, cited in Udry and Conley, 2005) find that people with 
weak ties to group leadership are reluctant to fallow their land for fear of finding it 
reallocated to a rival when it is time to re-establish cultivation. Women who are at 
the margins of political networks fallow relatively less. Thus, if rights to land are 
acquired by ongoing negotiations, security will be dependent on the terms by which 
people participate in the relevant networks (Berry, 1993).  
As we have seen in the preceding paragraphs, the usefulness of an objective 
analysis of the different dimensions of tenure security is greatly enhanced when 
informed by people’s own perceptions of whether or not their rights are secure, and 
their actual experiences with security. In Cameroon, following the Land Ordinance 
of 1974, for instance, farmers only engaged in the titling process until their parcels 
were fitted with concrete boundary markers and did not pursue registration and 
titling (Firmin-Sellers and Sellers, 1999). For them, these markers, which 
symbolized government authority, were sufficient signals to keep off others’ land 
and secure their rights. Consequently, what individuals and groups do to modify 
processes to suit their immediate needs is an important dimension of security to 
explore. 
Tenure security can thus be evaluated in different ways including: the range 
of rights vested in individuals and groups, whether these rights face any threats in 
the short and long term, the mode of acquisition of these rights, the terms by which 
the rights were acquired, disputes, and the material/physical ways in which people 
attempt to secure their rights. The general point is that while researchers and 
practitioners may seek common ways to measure tenure security, the sources of 
insecurity may vary widely and so will the proxies and measures. Nonetheless, the  
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implications of insecurity on welfare can be approximated by using the indicators 
outlined in earlier sections of the paper. 
 
Collective Action and Poverty Reduction 
Conceptualizing collective action 
 
Collective action is a multi-layered concept, which has been subject to multiple 
interpretations and applications in research.  It may take different forms in different 
contexts and is difficult to conceptualize, operationalize, and measure (Poteete and 
Ostrom, 2004).  In some cases, collective action can appear as institutional 
development (e.g. creating rules for community forest management); in others, it 
may take the shape of resource mobilization (e.g. jointly investing in watershed 
maintenance).  Other forms that cooperation may take include coordination of 
activities and information sharing (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004).  
Case-studies of cooperation in natural resource management conceptualize 
collective action in different ways according to how it plays out in their particular 
contexts.  Pender and Scherr (2002) view it as a factor in organizational 
development promoting collective regulation of natural resources and collective 
investment in protecting common lands or watersheds to achieve collective 
benefits.  However, even though commonly-used definition of collective action 
created by Marshall
5 implies that organizations may serve as a channel for collective 
action, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2002b) warn about the potential pitfall of equating 
organizations with collective action, since the latter can exist without a coordinating 
organization. Besides, not all organizations produce collective action. Others view 
collective action as levels of participation in decision-making and benefit-sharing in 
natural resource management (German et al., 2006; Krishna, 2001).   
On the other hand, some to choose to focus on the ‘social movement’ aspect 
of the functional definition of collective action, highlighting its potential to mobilize 
people beyond just managing a common property resource to larger-scale 
cooperation around rights to a resource (for example, Branford’s and Rocha’s 
(2002) account of the Landless Peasant Movement in Brazil). Yet others view 
collective action as a set of social structures (formal or informal), norms, and rules 
that bring people together.  Badstue et al. (2005), for example, see collective 
action as a social arrangement, linked by a set of rules and responsibilities, for the 
mutual supply of seed between a well-defined group of farmers in the Central 
Valley region of Mexico.   
It is clear from the case-studies mentioned above as well as so many others 
that there is no single way of conceptualizing collective action.  Consequently, using 
a comprehensive, but disaggregated approach that considers different aspects and 
forms of collective action is necessary (German et al., 2006).  This would also 
include a careful consideration of the form collective action takes in a given context 
                                                      
 
5 "Action taken by a group (either directly or on its behalf through an organization) in pursuit of 




to be better able to draw comparisons when appropriate (Poteete and Ostrom, 
2004).  In addition, it is important to keep in mind that collective action may 
manifest itself not only as an institution (rules of the game applied over and over 
again), but also as a one-time event (e.g. political rally or one-time watershed 
maintenance activity) or a process (see examples of participatory action research in 
Sultana and Thompson, 2004; German et al., 2008).  
Identifying the nature and form of collective action is incomplete without 
considering the factors that influence cooperation. One of the principal areas to 
focus on in collective action research is the issue of costs (both tangible and 
intangible) and incentives for cooperation (Swallow et al.,2002; Meinzen-Dick et al., 
2002a).  Where the costs of cooperation are higher, for example due to community 
heterogeneity, large distances, externally imposed systems, or traditional societal 
practices, collective action is less likely to exist or be effective (Pender and Scherr, 
2002; Godquin and Quisumbing, 2006; Badstue et al., 2005).  Institutional 
mechanisms that limit free riding can also increase the likelihood of collective 
action. These include face-to-face communication and shaming non-cooperators, 
participating in and influencing rule-making, and graduated sanctions that are 
credible (Ostrom, 2005; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992; Ostrom, 1990). 
However, formal recognition and validation by government authorities can assure 
cooperating groups that their activities will not be disrupted in the future (Agrawal, 
2001). Technological change and market integration are other factors that can 
undermine collective action (Agrawal, 2001).  
Furthermore, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) suggest that there are several 
concepts such as agency and social capital that are closely related to the notion of 
collective action. The concepts of social capital and collective action are especially 
prone to be confused, misused, or used interchangeably.   However, there is a 
profound difference between the two. Social capital refers to the norms of 
reciprocity and networks or associations that promote collective action for mutual 
benefit (Putnam, 1993; Woolcock, 2004). This and other definitions (see Fukuyama, 
2000; Narayan and Pritchett, 1999) suggest that social capital serves as the 
structural basis for collective action by providing the normative framework for the 
latter.  To better differentiate between the concepts, Uphoff (2000) suggests 
viewing social capital as a stock variable that captures social relations, and 
collective action as one of the flows associated with it.  Krishna (2001) adds that 
social capital can be seen as propensity for mutually beneficial collective action.   
 
The Role of Collective Action in Poverty Reduction   
How does collective action work to improve well-being? By providing information, 
reducing the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, and facilitating mutually beneficial 
joint action, it can enhance the ability of participants to access and defend 
resources, transform them into income, and access institutions and organizations 
that can facilitate resource access, defense, and transformation (Adato et al, 2006; 
Bebbington, 1999; Johnson et al., 2002).   In addition, collective action can 
increase the negotiating power of the poor and improve their access to resources.  
In its capacity to foster empowerment, it may serve to strengthen the bargaining 
power of disadvantaged community groups (Agarwal, 1994).  Women, for example, 
benefit from collective action via the increased role in negotiation of their rights in  
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the public domain and greater representation in decision-making as well as 
improved livelihoods (Pandolfelli et al., 2007).  Therefore, collective action is an 
empowerment tool, engendering political equity and catalyzing the discussion and 
creation of equitable processes (German et al. 2006).  Moreover, collective action 
allows a more effective technology adoption due to the lowered information costs 
and the landscape scale of adoption (see Swallow et al., 2002 and Ravnborg et al., 
2002). 
Networks of trust and mutual accountability linking individuals in 
communities (not usually all members of the community) are critical in helping to 
break the problem of access to financial capital (Okten and Osili, 2004; Haddad and 
Maluccio, 2003; Putnam, 1993), to diversify households’ livelihoods portfolios, to 
cope with shortages of labor and inputs (Bird and Shepherd, 2003), to protect 
themselves against unexpected expenditures (Dercon et al, 2005), and as a 
mechanism for risk-smoothing and dealing with shocks (Fafchamps and Lund 
2003). From the examples above it is clear that increased participation in groups or 
networks implies greater enjoyment of public services, the use of more improved 
agricultural technologies, increased opportunities for participation in credit 
programs, and assistance in mitigating the consequences of various forms of risk on 
households incomes.  
 
Measuring collective action  
  Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) emphasize that when studying collective action, 
researchers face three main challenges: how to conceptualize collective action, how 
to develop an appropriate analytical framework to measure it, and how to 
operationalize it for empirical research.  Some suggestions on how to conceptualize 
or define collective action (as well as the related concept of social capital) are 
discussed in the previous section, so this section provides suggestions on how to 
measure it while doing research.  In addition to the difficulties in direct 
measurement arising from the multi-faceted and dynamic nature of collective 
action, there are other challenges in trying to operationalize collective action for 
studies due to the subjective nature of the variables used to describe it (trust, 
reciprocity, reputation, participation, etc.) (Poteete and Ostrom, 2004).  
Furthermore, most scholars agree that the appropriate approach to analyzing or 
measuring collective action depends on the purpose of the study, which means that 
the empirical manifestations of this concept  are also contextual (Meinzen-Dick et 
al., 2004; Poteete and Ostrom, 2004; Krishna, 2001).   
To capture the dynamism of collective action, Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004) 
propose examining its spatial and temporal scales.  The spatial scale refers to the 
unit of analysis that is chosen in a particular study.  While some studies of 
collective action on the resource units (see Meinzen-Dick et al., 2002a and Badstue 
et al., 2005), others study the concept in terms of social units (Padmanabhan, 
2006).  Yet others, such as McCarthy et al. (2004), suggest looking across multiple 
units including household-level data, community-level institutions, and information 
on the outcomes of cooperation.  In addition, examining collective action across the 
temporal scale may be necessary to investigate changes over time.  However, there 
are many challenges for such studies due to the difficulty (and expense) of 
collecting such time-series data and the potential complications in the statistical  
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analysis (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004).  Dercon et al. (2008) and Quisumbing et 
al.(2008) attempt to conduct such analysis and measure the welfare outcome of 
collective action using panel data from Ethiopia and the Philippines, respectively.  
They operationalize collective action as participation in local institutions such as 
burial societies and productive networks.   
When considering linkages between poverty and collective action, there is a 
possibility of reverse causation between income and collective action. For example, 
better-off households might have a higher demand for associational life because 
they have more leisure time and more resources to contribute to a particular group. 
On the other hand, participation in networks may lead to higher incomes through 
the mechanisms described above (mutual insurance, group borrowing, cooperation 
in technology adoption, etc.).  This ambiguity introduces endogeneity into the 
empirical estimations and may lead to biased results.   
Quantitative techniques, such as the instrumental variables approach, can be 
used to try to clarify the relationship between income and collective action.   This 
technique requires that you have a third variable (or set of variables) that are 
correlated with the independent variable of interest (collective action) but not with 
the dependent variable (income).  This third variable is the "instrument" you use to 
establish causality.  Since it is unrelated to the dependent variable, it is not 
endogenous and thus avoids any bias in estimation.   In an instrumental variable 
approach, the instrument is used to predict the value of the independent variable 
since the instrument is exogenous; so is the predicted value of the independent 
variable.  The key then in establishing a relationship between social capital and 
income is to identify a variable (an instrument) that is a determinant of 
participation in social groups or networks, but is not directly related to income 































The action arena comprises the dynamic part of the conceptual framework 
where actors possessing different types and varying levels of action resources, 
facing a specific action situation that is embedded within a given structure of legal 
and political institutions, interact with each other to produce some outcomes. 
Analyzing the action arena allows us to understand how poor people interact with 
each other, why they face certain outcomes, and how they can change outcomes. 
Holland and Brook (2005) suggest that there is a need to understand how 
individual agency can affect the systemic forces by which institutions (rules of the 
game) are established to benefit the powerful. Moser (2005), on the other hand, 
pushes for greater focus on identifying the social and political processes that 
empower or disempower people in different arenas of negotiation, such as 
negotiations over rights. 
These actions  include creating channels by which the poor (or their 
representatives) can access, control, or contest policy processes; or engage in 
political discourses in which poverty/poverty reduction are significant issues; or 
identify social and political practices of the poor that can form a basis for 
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influencing decision-making, agendas, policy, and program implementation 
(Engberg-Pedersen and Webster, 2002). These strategies are envisioned to enable 
the poor to gain voice and capacity to influence agendas, shape discourse, and 
make demands, which in turn may help them access, control, or secure rights to 
assets, services, and resources.  
But how do we establish individual and collective agency, i.e. the action 
resources that individuals and groups possess that influences whether or not they 
can affect a particular situation or decision making arena? Measures of individual 
power and of the action resources held by individuals remain relevant in this 
section. Thus, assets (physical, human, natural, social, and financial) that enable 
people to withstand shocks and expand their choices are important indicators of 
their individual and collective capacities to change institutions. As indicated in the 
earlier sections of this paper, those can be measured and analyzed using a variety 
of quantitative and qualitative techniques. 
Habitus, or one’s view of the world and one’s place in it, is an important 
consideration when trying to understand poor men and women’s capacity to act (di 
Gregorio et al, 2008). Habitus is one’s disposition, which one develops through 
personal histories of the self-reinforcing experiences of his or her social location. By 
internalizing the social structure and one’s place in it, one comes to determine what 
is possible and what is not possible for one’s life and develops aspirations and 
practices accordingly. Each piece of learning reinforces the behaviors and 
preferences that will keep the individual locked into a particular social location.  The 
material, social, and cultural conditions of a particular social location teach an 
individual what is possible, appropriate, and expected. These world views are then 
externalized into actions and subsequent patterns of interactions, e.g. privileged 
groups maintaining positions of power and less privileged groups remaining in 
subordinate positions (Bourdieu, 1973). The consequences of habitus on poverty 
are large.  
To examine how habitus affects agency, it might be useful to track the 
history of action and inaction, combined with a careful disaggregation of society 
across the more common cleavages such as gender, race, caste, ethnicity, religion, 
region, and class can provide insights into. Alternatively, actors can be interviewed 
directly to establish what they view as their opportunity structure and what they 
need to succeed. For example, education policy analysts have attempted to 
operationalize habitus by measuring student’s beliefs about their future (Dumais, 
2002; McClelland, 1990). Other studies have used life histories as an initial way to 
determine variables that could then be measured in more quantitative ways. In a 
study of women and poverty, Fram et al. (2006) used unstructured interviews 
focused on women’s life histories to find out their experiences in major domains of 
their lives and to examine events and decisions that women understood as 
influencing their longer-term well being. Clearly, it is extremely difficult to 
represent one’s habitus or worldview in a single or even a large set of variables; 
however, scholars have shown that the effects of habitus on well-being can be 
isolated either through historical analysis or through quantitative surveys as well as 
data analysis techniques that account for correlation among independent variables 
as well as endogeneity. 
As we saw earlier, collective action and property rights are essential action 
resources for the poor.  Moreover, collective action can make other action resources  
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available to the poor by linking them with other groups through social movements 
or connecting them with others who can represent their interests in different 
arenas. However, in most cases, collective action for poverty reduction can be more 
effective if it involves broad coalitions between policy makers/government agents 
and civil society actors (Fox, 2004). Analyzing the nature and level of linkages 
between citizens and public services can help determine the extent to which 
synergistic strategies or coproduction is present (Evans, 1996).  
Similarly, beyond their direct economic importance, property rights—
especially access to land—fulfill a number of social functions which enable the poor 
to take advantage of various action resources.  In many rural communities, land 
distribution is associated not only with the well-being of the household, but with its 
social standing in the community.  This position in turn shapes access to many 
government services, influence in local politics, participation in social networks, and 
determines intrahousehold relations.  Securing property rights for the 
disadvantaged elements of a rural community will ensure their greater participation 
in the associational life and presence on the local political arena, which can lead to 
a favorable outcome of interactions in the action arena. 
  
Outcomes: From measurement to evaluation 
The objective of poverty-related research is to examine how various policies, 
programs, and interactions between multiple actors in a poverty context affect the 
well-being outcomes for the poor.  These outcomes are usually complex and multi-
faceted. The conceptual framework of Di Gregorio et al. (2008) proposes several 
criteria that can be used when evaluating poverty outcomes (see Figure 1).  These 
criteria range from those that are easily examined quantitatively (income levels) to 
those that require a discussion of definition and measurement methodology 
(inclusion, sustainability) since the latter may be identified and understood 
differently in different settings. 
Nonetheless, all the criteria in various combinations may be used to come up 
with indicators to evaluate (not just measure) poverty outcomes. Depending on the 
objective of the evaluation, relevant outcome indicators can be aggregated into a 
comprehensive index. Alternatively, different indicators can be reported 
individually. For policy making, however, it is imperative that the way indicators are 
aggregated into an index is made explicit. It is also critical that tradeoffs between 
the different outcomes that indicators may lead to are assessed and clarified, 
including the implications for different segments of society. While it may introduce 
difficulties in comparing across settings, it is also useful to bear in mind the 
objectives of the poor themselves when considering tradeoffs. At best, the use of 
indicators that people themselves can monitor and report on is desirable. For all the 
criteria, i.e. incomes, sustainability, social and political inclusion, security, etc., a 




6. CONCLUSION: BACK TO THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The main purpose of this paper was to provide a pathway to conduct poverty-
related research with special attention to the issues of property rights and collective 
action.  It did so by attempting to “unpack” the elements of the conceptual 
framework and positing relevant questions that catalyze deeper investigation of 
factors underlying poverty and shedding more light on how people’s livelihoods are 
affected by collective action and property rights.   
Another effort that this study attempted was to emphasize the crucial 
importance of institutions as the backbone for all poverty-related issues.  By 
demonstrating how various dimensions of institutions (power dynamics, tenure 
regimes, social networks) serve as indicators of broader institutional change in 
favor of the poor, it tried to draw attention away from the traditional “one-sided” 
measures of results and highlight the need for a more comprehensive analysis and 
a detailed evaluation of outcomes.  By “operationalizing” the conceptual framework 
(see Figure 1), we hope to provide a useful tool which can drive poverty-related 
research that would take into account the multi-faceted nature of poverty examined 
through the lens of institutions. 
Researchers and practitioners have independently done much to explore the 
role of collective action and property rights for poverty reduction. Our review brings 
together methodological lessons from these often unrelated pieces. It shows that 
there are gains to studying poverty reduction from the dimensions of institutions of 
collective action and property rights as they seem to be critical determinants of the 
diverse assets that people can use to improve their well-being. Further, an 
understanding of how these institutions affect poverty is increased when multiple 
methodologies are used to study its multidimensionality.  
However, the kind of research that this conceptual framework calls for faces 
numerous challenges. Policy instruments that foster collective action and pro-poor 
property rights reforms often occur over the longer run. Moreover, poverty 
reduction and institutional reform are not part of an agenda that is favored all 
round, especially when the relative position of powerful interests is challenged. 
Research itself can be dangerous for the researcher and for those providing 
information, yet understanding power and how it shapes the way collective action 
and property rights can attain some poverty reduction outcomes is critical yet often 
overlooked. In sum, it is evident from this review that innovative research designs 
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